Five Key Judgments for 2026
The 2024 "open-weight acceleration" thesis is now operational reality. Governments that understood this early are pulling ahead. Those that did not are scrambling. Here are the five judgments that define the current landscape:
Evidence: Trends and Predictions Materialized
In 2024, I published an analysis titled "La Revolucion de la Inteligencia Artificial: Viaje al Este", arguing that openness combined with Asian momentum would fundamentally reshape the AI market and capabilities landscape. That thesis has been validated across multiple dimensions.
The Open-Weight Wave
Alibaba's Qwen 2.5 delivered on the scale thesis, announcing over 100 open-source models across variants -- from edge-deployable to frontier-competitive. This was not a research release; it was an industrial strategy designed to establish Qwen as default infrastructure across the developer ecosystem [1].
DeepSeek doubled down on open source by releasing code repositories supporting shared models, signaling that the competitive moat lies not in model secrecy but in ecosystem velocity and deployment tooling [2].
Meta's Llama 4 extended the open-weight paradigm to natively multimodal architectures, reinforcing the portability trend. When frontier-class models are available as downloadable weights, the strategic question shifts entirely from "can we access a good model?" to "can we deploy, evaluate, and govern it?" [3].
Model access is no longer the binding constraint. With Qwen, Llama, DeepSeek, and others releasing frontier-competitive weights, the real question is: does your institution have the capacity to evaluate, procure, deploy, and govern these systems? Most governments do not -- yet.
The Policy Response
America's AI Action Plan (July 2025) explicitly calls for encouraging open-source and open-weight AI development, and -- critically -- for building an AI evaluations ecosystem. This is a significant policy signal: the US government recognizes that the strategic bottleneck is not model development but evaluation and governance capacity [4].
The AI diffusion framework illustrates the volatility in compute diplomacy. An interim rule published in January 2025 was later rescinded, with the administration shifting to new guidance and strengthened rules [5][6]. This kind of policy oscillation is itself a risk factor that governments and industry must account for in their planning.
The EU AI Act continues its phased implementation -- prohibitions and AI literacy requirements first, then GPAI obligations, followed by the full high-risk transition. The EU's approach represents the most comprehensive attempt at AI regulation globally, and its effects are being felt well beyond European borders [7].
What Changed Since 2024: The Constraint Moved
From "Best Model" to "Best System"
The competitive frontier has shifted decisively. It is no longer about who has the best model. It is about who can build the best system -- meaning LLMs integrated with tools, retrieval, permissions, guardrails, and human oversight into coherent workflows. Agentic systems (LLMs + tools + retrieval + permissions) are becoming the real product.
This has profound implications for policy. Regulations designed around static models -- "this model is safe" or "this model is dangerous" -- miss the point entirely. The same model can be benign in one system configuration and hazardous in another. Policy must therefore govern systems, not just models.
From "Ethics Debate" to "Compute Diplomacy"
The policy frontier has moved beyond abstract ethics discussions. The real battleground is now compute diplomacy: chips, data centers, trusted hosting, smuggling and diversion prevention, and enforcement capacity. Countries that control or influence compute supply chains hold structural advantages. Countries that depend on others for compute are structurally exposed.
This is not theoretical. Export controls on advanced semiconductors, data center location decisions, and bilateral compute agreements are already reshaping the AI landscape. The question for policymakers is whether their governance frameworks are keeping pace with these realities.
"The binding constraint for governments is no longer model access -- it's institutional capacity: evaluation, procurement, auditability, and adoption."
Policy Moves: Practical and Adoption-Oriented
Theory without practice is noise. Below are five policy recommendations grounded in operational experience -- designed for governments that want to treat governance as a competitive advantage rather than a compliance burden.
1. Build an Evaluations Ecosystem (Public + Private)
The single most important investment a government can make right now is in evaluation capacity. This means:
- Per-use-case test suites -- both representative and adversarial -- that reflect the actual conditions under which AI systems will operate in government contexts
- Failure-mode taxonomies covering truthfulness, bias, uncertainty calibration, and tool abuse scenarios specific to agentic systems
- Post-deployment monitoring requirements with defined incident playbooks that specify escalation paths, remediation procedures, and public disclosure thresholds
Without evaluation capacity, procurement becomes guesswork, regulation becomes theater, and incidents become crises.
2. Procure Control, Not "AI"
Government procurement of AI systems is broken in a predictable way: contracts specify capabilities ("the system shall answer questions about X") but not control mechanisms. This must change. Contracts must require:
- Logging and audit access -- full traceability of system behavior, not just inputs and outputs
- Change control and regression testing -- model updates must be tested against established baselines before deployment
- Incident response SLAs -- defined response times for different severity levels of system failures
- Data handling boundaries -- explicit constraints on data retention, cross-purpose use, and third-party access
- Portability and exit clauses -- the ability to switch providers without losing institutional knowledge or operational continuity
The principle is simple: if you cannot audit it, you do not control it. If you do not control it, you should not deploy it in government.
3. Treat Agentic Workflows as High-Risk by Design
Agentic AI systems -- those that take actions, use tools, and execute multi-step workflows -- represent a qualitatively different risk profile from passive inference systems. Until robust evaluation and governance frameworks exist for agentic deployments, the default posture should be to treat them as high-risk. This means:
- Explicit tool permissions -- agentic systems should only access the specific tools and data sources explicitly authorized for their workflow
- Safe-action policies -- pre-defined boundaries on what actions the system can take autonomously versus what requires human approval
- "Human authority" gates for rights-impacting pathways -- any AI action that affects individual rights, benefits, or legal status must include meaningful human review
4. Align Compute Diplomacy with Verification Reality
Compute diplomacy only works if agreements can be verified. Too many international AI agreements are aspirational statements without enforcement mechanisms. The lesson from arms control applies here: agreements must be paired with measurable compliance auditing. Enforcement resourcing matters as much as policy text.
This means investing in the technical and institutional capacity to verify compute-related commitments -- from chip tracking mechanisms to data center inspection protocols to supply chain auditing capabilities.
5. Invest in Government Operator Capacity
The most overlooked dimension of government AI readiness is operator capacity. Governments need trained "AI operators" who can:
- Run evaluations against established test suites and interpret results
- Manage incidents when systems behave unexpectedly, including triage, containment, and root cause analysis
- Iterate workflows based on real-world performance data, continuously improving system reliability and effectiveness
This is not a role that existing IT staff can absorb as a side responsibility. It requires dedicated training, career paths, and institutional recognition. Countries that build this capacity early will have a structural advantage in AI deployment.
Governments that treat governance as a competitive advantage -- investing in evaluation capacity, procurement control, operator training, and compute sovereignty -- will outperform those that treat governance as mere compliance. The window to build this institutional capacity is narrowing as AI systems become more capable and more deeply embedded in public services.
This analysis draws on the following primary sources, mapped to the key judgments above:
- Open-weight acceleration: Alibaba Qwen 2.5 release [1], DeepSeek open-source strategy [2], Meta Llama 4 [3]
- US policy signals: America's AI Action Plan (July 2025) [4], AI Diffusion Framework and rescission [5][6]
- EU regulatory framework: EU AI Act phased implementation [7]
- Compute diplomacy: BIS export control actions [6], bilateral compute agreements (ongoing)
- Enterprise adoption: McKinsey State of AI (65% genAI adoption, early 2024; ~71% by 2025)
References
- Alibaba Cloud. "Alibaba Cloud Unveils New AI Models and Revamped Infrastructure for AI Computing." alibabacloud.com/blog/alibaba-cloud-unveils-new-ai-models-and-revamped-infrastructure-for-ai-computing_601622
- Reuters. "DeepSeek to share some AI model code, doubling down on open source." reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/deepseek-share-some-ai-model-code-doubling-down-open-source-2025-02-21
- Meta AI. "Llama 4: Multimodal Intelligence." ai.meta.com/blog/llama-4-multimodal-intelligence
- The White House. "America's AI Action Plan." July 2025. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf
- Federal Register. "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion." January 15, 2025. federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion
- Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). "Department of Commerce Announces Rescission of Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule." bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-rescission-biden-era-artificial-intelligence-diffusion-rule-strengthens
- European Commission. "Regulatory Framework for AI." digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai